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BAKER V. CARR, THE CENSUS, AND 
THE POLITICAL AND STATISTICAL 
GEOGRAPHY OF THE UNITED STATES: 
THE ORIGIN AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC 
LAW 94-171 
Margo Anderson† 
An absurd but fundamental incongruence exists in most states 
between census geography and political electoral geography. 
That is, the Bureau of Census requires that census tracts, 
enumeration districts, and blocks all follow “easily 
recognizable” boundaries such as roads, rivers, and perhaps 
transmission lines and aqueducts, but not “invisible” property 
and political lines. 
Richard Morrill, 19811 
 
As we approach the fiftieth anniversary of Baker v. Carr,2 it is 
hard to overestimate the impact of the decision. Ending as it did fifty 
years of massive malapportionment in legislative assemblies 
throughout the United States, it led to a raft of successor decisions 
and a domino effect of unanticipated political changes, which were in 
turn amplified by the passage of the Voting Rights Act3 three years 
later in 1965.  
                                                                                                                 
† Professor, Department of History, University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee. 
1
 RICHARD L. MORRILL, POLITICAL REDISTRICTING AND GEOGRAPHIC THEORY 33 
(1981). 
2
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
3
 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa–6 (2006). 
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My task here, as historian and longtime observer of the federal 
statistical system, is twofold. First I give some historical context on 
the numerical issues implicit in the mandate of Article 1, section 2, 
paragraph 3 of the federal Constitution4 and the “one person, one 
vote” standard.5 Second, I examine the impact of the new standard on 
the federal statistical system, particularly the decennial census used to 
apportion and redistrict legislative seats each decade.  
I. IT’S ALL ABOUT NUMBERS 
A. Constitutional Origins of the Census 
In the summer of 1787, slightly more than a decade after the 
thirteen colonies had declared their independence from Great Britain, 
several dozen men met at Philadelphia to try to improve the existing 
American national government structure.6 War had ended in 1783 and 
the infant nation had returned to peace. Yet severe political and 
economic problems plagued the country. The Articles of 
Confederation, finally ratified in 1781 as the framework for the 
national government, had not been functioning well for a number of 
years. By the late 1780s, the states were willing to send delegates to 
discuss amendments. There were many different proposals about what 
to do, and although these men had the common experience of the 
Revolutionary Era to unite them, they also had sectional, political, 
religious, and local interests to divide them. 
The men who gathered in Philadelphia thus faced a delicate and 
complex set of political questions. On the one hand, they had to 
empower a national government to deal with recurring problems 
arising from the unique historical development of the United States. 
The governments of the individual colonies had few connections with 
one another prior to independence; they did not easily merge into a 
United States, and in fact often looked jealously upon one another. 
One set of issues revolved around replacing the functions the British 
had served during the Colonial Era: i.e., national defense, diplomacy, 
trade policy, taxation, the opening of new land or the creation of new 
colonies. On the other hand, the national government had to respect 
the autonomy of the individual states, recognize and mediate 
differences among the states and their citizens, and develop 
                                                                                                                 
4
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3. 
5
 Cf. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1962) (“The conception of political 
equality . . . can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”). 
6
 MARGO ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 7–20 (1988) 
[hereinafter ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS]. 
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mechanisms to apportion power and tax burdens among the 
constituent elements of the United States. Revising the national 
government or devising a new one would be no easy matter. Several 
prior efforts had failed. Contemporaries might well have expected the 
men to disband with little accomplished at the end of the summer. 
We know now that did not happen; their deliberations resulted in a 
fundamentally new and breathtakingly radical governmental structure, 
which we have lived with ever since. Unlike the Articles, which 
mandated a one house Congress and no executive branch, the 
Constitution created three branches of government: executive, 
legislative and judicial. The legislature was bicameral, with the lower 
house apportioned among the states according to population and 
elected by the people, the upper house apportioned among the states 
and elected by the state legislatures. The executive branch was headed 
by a President elected by the people through the mechanism of the 
Electoral College. The new system increased the power of the 
national government considerably, yet it was also full of checks and 
balances to guarantee the powers of the states and citizens and to 
protect against the kind of tyranny the Crown had exercised. 
The complex and relatively explicit structures, the detailed 
enumeration and delegation of powers, and the system of checks and 
balances were all mechanisms intended to foster both “a more perfect 
union” (national unification) and the rights of the individual states. So 
also was the institution of a decennial census to measure the relative 
strength of the various elements of the population and periodically 
readjust the relative power of the states and local areas in the national 
government. Article 1, section 2 of the Constitution created the House 
of Representatives, and defined its membership and capacities.7 
Paragraph three of section 2 specified that the representatives and 
direct taxes were to be “apportioned among the several States which 
may be included within this Union, according to their respective 
numbers.”8 
This simple language provided the solution to one of the 
fundamental political controversies of the revolutionary era: namely 
how to allocate representation fairly in legislative assemblies. Before 
the Revolution, the colonists had protested their lack of representation 
in the British Parliament. The newly united thirteen colonies also 
struggled over the problem of the equitable distribution of the burdens 
and resources of the national government among large and small 
states. Critics had charged that the Articles of Confederation were an 
                                                                                                                 
7
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
8
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3. 
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unsatisfactory grounding for a national government precisely because 
states voted as units, regardless of their disparate wealth or 
populations. 
The 1787 Constitution allocated representation in the House 
according to population and in the Senate by state. Since direct taxes 
were also to be allocated according to population, the large states 
would gain House representation but incur a higher potential tax 
burden to the federal government. The strength of each state in the 
Electoral College would be determined by summing the state’s Senate 
and House members. Finally, the census was to be taken every ten 
years since the framers were well aware that populations—especially 
the American population—grew and shifted over time. 
The logic of the census system flowed from the experience and 
conceptions of the framers. The Founding Fathers debated other 
methods of allocating political power and tax capacity during the 
Philadelphia Convention. They discussed apportionments based upon 
land assessments, other measures of wealth, and population. They 
agreed that, theoretically, political power should be allocated on the 
basis of population and that tax capacity derived from wealth. 
Everyone agreed, however, that population was much easier to 
measure than wealth and that wealth was highly correlated with 
population. So, population would be the apportionment measure. The 
new census and apportionment mechanisms of the federal constitution 
were thus a crucial piece of the Great Compromise among the large 
and small states which made a national government possible. The 
periodic changes that had to take place to account for population 
growth and change were assigned to an automatic decennial routine, 
separated from the cycles of more frequent elections for House, 
Senate, and the Presidency, which were also designed to shift power 
among the constituent elements of the population. 
But there was one fly in the ointment that would come back to 
haunt the Framers in future years and that is of particular relevance. 
That was the question of defining exactly who was part of the 
“population” deserving the right to political participation in the 
society and owing responsibility to pay taxes to the state. The 
fundamental thrust of the discussion in the Constitutional Convention 
was to use the most expansive rule possible, including, for example, 
women, children, and the poor in the count, though they neither voted 
nor were necessarily responsible as individuals for taxes. The rub 
came when the Framers considered how to treat slaves and Indians. 
Should the southern states, for example, be granted political 
representation for their slaves? At the time southerners considered 
2012] THE ORIGIN AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC LAW 94-171 1157 
slaves “property” for purposes of tax assessments but did not count 
slaves when they apportioned their state legislatures. The double rule 
of using the same measure for representation and taxation broke down 
logically for slaves. Further, should Indians, who were generally 
considered outside the purview of the American polity and as 
members of foreign states, be counted for representation and 
taxation? 
The solution to these dilemmas was to hedge the universal rule of 
counting the population for apportionment with two provisos. The 
census clause in Article I, section 2, paragraph 3, continued: the 
“respective Numbers [of the population] . . . shall be determined by 
adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to 
Service for a term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
fifths of all other Persons.”9 The Three-Fifths Compromise required 
the census to count slaves separately so that the slave population 
could be discounted to three-fifths of the value of the free population 
for apportionment allocations. The second proviso eliminated 
“Indians not taxed” from the census altogether. Only people who 
came to be called “civilized Indians” were to be included in the 
decennial census count, and hence the apportionment totals. 10 
Two points should be made about these constitutional provisions. 
First, the Framers recognized that the numeric decision of the three-
fifths rules was arbitrary and only justified as a compromise 
necessary to move the overall constitutional revision process forward. 
Second, and relatedly, the Framers defined the population to be 
included or excluded, counted as whole people or as three-fifths of a 
person, according to the person’s civil status. To avoid ambiguity, the 
Constitution even clarified that unfree indentured servants, that is, 
“those bound to Service for a term of Years,” were to be included in 
the “free Persons.”11 Nowhere did the Constitution mention a racial 
classification, and, in fact, the Framers used the ambiguous “other 
persons” to define “slave.”12 But as the census was implemented, and 
in popular discourse, Americans translated the variable names listed 
on the census form to the racial attributes of “white,” “black,” 
“colored,” and “Indian” and ultimately replaced the civil statuses of 
free, slave, and “Indians not taxed.” 
                                                                                                                 
9
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 3. 
10
 Id. 
11
 Id. 
12
 Id. 
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B. Demographic History 
Today, the principle of representative democracy is a generally 
accepted one, and nations around the world take periodic censuses. A 
census seems a fairly obvious tool to use to apportion political power 
among a set of constituencies. Yet the United States was the first 
nation in the world to institute a regular population count to apportion 
political power. The principles that political power was a function of 
population and that population could be measured were truly 
innovative in the eighteenth century and only proved to be lasting as 
they were implemented in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Moreover, the census might well have been a rather minor 
constitutional innovation were it not for the extraordinary 
demographic character of the American population.13 The United 
States has had one of the most heterogeneous and demographically 
dynamic populations in the history of the world. In the past three 
centuries, the colonies and the United States have seen rapid 
population growth, major migrations, and sharp demographic 
transitions—all in the context of a racially and ethnically 
heterogeneous population. In 1700, about 250,000 people lived in the 
colonies. By the time of the Revolution the population was over two 
million. The first census counted 3.9 million people. The current 
population is roughly 310 million. The current land area of the 
country is four times the size of the nation in 1790; the population is 
almost eighty times larger. In 1850, the country was 85 percent rural; 
now it is 80 percent urban. From 1700 to the Civil War, the American 
population grew at the rate of 30-35 percent per decade. From 1860-
1910 it grew about 24 percent per decade; since then it has grown 
about 10-13 percent per decade. The median age of the population has 
increased greatly. In the early nineteenth century, it was around 
sixteen, reflecting the high birth rates and shorter expectation of life 
of the times. Now it is around thirty-seven. In the early nineteenth 
century, a child could expect to live about to the age of forty; now, a 
child will live for about seventy-eight years. 
The United States’ population was and remains racially and 
ethnically diverse. At the first census about a fifth of the population 
were African or African-American and primarily slaves. The larger 
majority was free and “white”—primarily from the British Isles. 
Although slavery ended during the tumultuous Civil War of the mid-
nineteenth century, racial distinctions continue to be major social 
                                                                                                                 
13
 MARGO J. ANDERSON & STEPHEN E. FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS? THE POLITICS OF 
CENSUS––TAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 14–17 (2001) [hereinafter ANDERSON & 
FIENBERG, WHO COUNTS?]. 
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markers in American society. Currently about 12 percent of the 
population is black; 16 percent is Hispanic/Latino. The non-Hispanic 
white population is slated to decline to 45 percent by 2050.14 
Between 1820 and 1980, fifty million immigrants came to the 
United States in search of jobs and a new life. During the years of the 
major European migrations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, 13-15 percent of the population was foreign born. This 
proportion fell to 5 percent by 1970, and with the surge in 
immigration in the past generation has risen again to 12 percent 
foreign-born. Finally, the American population was and is regionally 
heterogeneous. For example, currently 80 percent of the population is 
urban. However, in eighteen states over 80 percent of the population 
is urban; in another four states the population is over 50 percent rural. 
Seven states (all in the South) are more than one-fifth black; in 
nineteen states, the black population is less than 5 percent. 
These dramatic patterns make the decennial census and its 
apportionments major social, political, and intellectual events. 
Americans are accustomed to major demographic changes each 
decade and look to the census for their evidence. Census-based 
apportionments are supposed to take some very difficult questions 
about the distribution of political power and economic resources off 
the immediate legislative agenda and consign them to predetermined 
allocations. Yet, because so much is at stake, the census and the 
decennial process of reapportionment and redistricting is subject to 
massive political maneuvering to maintain or advance political power 
within the context of the constitutional framework. The census 
numbers themselves are subject to incredible scrutiny and analysis, as 
each decade Congress, state legislatures, and other governmental 
bodies redistribute legislative seats, tax revenue, and grants-in-aid on 
the basis of the population-based apportionment formulas. By 
definition for every gainer in the reapportionment game, there must 
be a loser and thus the process, though necessary, is politically 
delicate and painful to the losers. Americans have not always agreed 
on whether the demographic changes in the population are good or 
bad, implying “progress” and “manifest destiny” or “degradation” and 
“race suicide.” Accordingly, the development of the census itself as a 
more elaborate and more scientific count each decade and the 
development of the art and science of redistricting are intimately 
bound up with the political and social history of the nation. 
                                                                                                                 
14
 This material draws largely from ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE U.S. CENSUS: FROM THE 
CONSTITUTION TO THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (ACS) (Margo J. Anderson, Constance 
F. Citro & Joseph J. Salvo eds., Sage CQ Press 2d ed. 2012).  
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C. Implementing the Constitutional Provisions 
I have written extensively elsewhere about the history of the 
implementation of the Census Clause and reapportionment and 
redistricting process.15 For our purposes today, suffice it to say that 
the Framers recognized very early that the constitutional language 
was only a starting point for clarifying how to make the decennial 
process function. A few examples should suffice to illustrate the 
point.   
The constitutional language did not prescribe how Congress was 
actually supposed to calculate the apportionment “according to their 
respective numbers.”16 Congress recognized by 1792 that there were 
many possible legitimate formulas for the calculation and that 
different formulas produced different political outcomes. That fact led 
Washington to use the presidential veto for the first time to settle the 
dispute after the 1790 census.   
State government officials recognized that they could construct 
legislative districts for their party’s political advantage by the 1810 
Census, and the term “gerrymander” was coined by the Boston 
Gazette to name this new political innovation. 
As new states were admitted to the union, the rapid population 
growth and westward expansion of the population in the nineteenth 
century prompted Congress to increase the size of the House of 
Representatives. As the House size expanded, the states formed from 
the original thirteen colonies lost the capacity to control the House of 
Representatives or the votes in the Electoral College. Most 
importantly, the greater differential population growth in the North 
threatened the future of the slave economy of the Southern states. As 
one commentator put it, “the laws of population are themselves 
abolitionists.” 17 That the Southern states seceded from the union 
weeks after the 1860 census results and the allocations for the next 
congressional reapportionment were published is not an accident.   
After the Civil War, urbanization and industrialization, particularly 
in northern and midwestern states, shifted political power to the cities, 
home to what rural Protestant Americans saw as the nation’s 
concentration of immigrants, social disorder, Catholics, and corrupt 
urban political bosses. These “people,” rural Americans claimed, 
should not be represented in Congress or permitted to become citizens 
and vote. When the results of the 1920 Census were published, 
                                                                                                                 
15
 See, e.g., ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6; ANDERSON & FIENBERG, 
WHO COUNTS?, supra note 13. 
16
 U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, para. 3. 
17
 ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6, at 57. 
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Congress found, for the only time in the history of the republic, that it 
could not muster a majority to pass a reapportionment bill.   
In other words, population counting, reapportionment, and 
redistricting have never been simple, automatic, non-political 
processes. Rather they have always been intimately tied up with the 
larger political and social controversies of the day and have 
sometimes served to resolve, and sometimes served to exacerbate, 
those controversies.   
D. The Corrupt Bargain of the 1920s 
For our purposes, the roots of the Baker v. Carr decision and the 
Reapportionment Revolution of the past half century lie in the 
apportionment controversies of the 1920s.18 Congress faced several 
dilemmas at the time, which raised again the ambiguities in the 
original constitutional apportionment mandate. First, Congress 
decided in 1910 to stop the growth in the size of the House. Thus, the 
1920 reapportionment would have to be a true zero-sum game; one 
state’s gain would be another state’s loss. Second, several 
mathematicians produced competing apportionment methodologies, 
which had the effect of producing different allocations for key states. 
Third, the demographic trends evident in the 1920 Census results 
were not to the liking of the Republican majority in Congress. The 
census results showed major shifts in population to the cities, to the 
far west, to places in the country populated by immigrants. The 
census, critics held, had to be wrong. So leaders proposed and failed 
to pass bill after bill until, by the late 1920s, key Congressional 
leaders proposed an automatic mechanism to go into place after the 
1930 Census. This bill passed in June 1929. To secure passage, 
Congress removed the mandate—in every apportionment bill since 
1840—that required Congressional districts to be compact and 
contiguous and equally sized as nearly as possible within states. 
Congress, in other words, reapportioned power among the states, but 
quietly acquiesced to rural malapportionment within states. States 
with growing urban populations would gain seats, but those seats 
would not necessarily be allocated to urban districts.   
The Census Bureau reported the 1930 Census results in December. 
The numbers were indeed stark. Twenty-one states would lose 
twenty-seven seats in the House; eleven other states would gain them. 
California's delegation grew from eleven to twenty; Michigan's from 
thirteen to seventeen. Texas gained three seats; New York, New 
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 ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6, at 149–58. 
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Jersey and Ohio, two each. After twenty years, Congress was 
reapportioned. 
But the last word was not quite in. In 1932, Stewart Broom of 
Mississippi sued the state for violating the usual districting 
requirements of equality of size, and contiguity and compactness of 
territory in its redistricting after the 1930 Census. Broom claimed that 
the state had not followed the Congressional guidelines in laying out 
the new districts. The Court searched the legislative history of the 
reapportionment law and concluded that “[i]t was manifestly the 
intention of the Congress not to reenact the provision as to 
compactness, contiguity, and equality in population with respect to 
the districts to be created pursuant to the reapportionment under the 
Act of 1929.”19 It was, in short, perfectly legal to create 
gerrymandered and malapportioned Congressional districts. 
By the early 1930s, former U.S. Census official Walter Willcox 
pointed out, the size of New York's Congressional districts varied by 
a factor of 7.8. The largest district contained 799,407 people; the 
smallest 90,671. Congress had found a conservative backward-
looking solution to the “problem” of the rise of new constituencies of 
the urban industrial society. They changed the rules of the 
apportionment game to preserve rural and small-town dominance of 
legislative halls for another generation. “These actions eventually 
precipitated another reapportionment crisis, the ‘reapportionment 
revolution’ of the 1960s.”20 Between the late 1920s and the 1960s, 
despite increasingly obvious malapportionment of Congress and state 
legislatures, reapportionment was not a burning political issue. 
Several factors drove it from the public agenda. First, and most 
obviously, the onset of the Great Depression in 1929–1930 raised a 
new and frightening set of questions about the viability of the modern 
American economy which pushed many of the pressing issues of the 
1920s off the legislative agenda. Immigration restriction seemed 
unnecessary if a depressed economy no longer attracted migrants. 
Prohibition appeared to be a foolish crusade. Government policy 
makers, like the population generally, struggled to cope with mass 
unemployment and the collapse of the locally based social welfare 
system, a farm crisis, and the collapse of the most prosperous sectors 
of industry. In the face of the Depression, malapportioned legislatures 
were simply not important.  
Second, numerical apportionment mechanisms are supposed to 
depoliticize the periodic allocation and transfer of power and 
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 Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1, 7 (1932). 
20
 ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6, at 157. 
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resources among the elements of the population—in this case among 
the states. They are designed to take these questions off the current 
policy agenda and consign them to “automatic” allocations. This is 
not to say that such apportionment mechanisms are “fair” or 
politically “neutral.” It is to reiterate the conclusions that the Framers 
drew from their experience in developing original constitutional 
provisions, particularly the Three–Fifths Compromise: an imperfect 
but workable apportionment rule is better than no rule at all. 
II. THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION AND THE CENSUS  
My second task is to examine what happened when federal and 
state officials in charge of reapportionment and redistricting, and 
officials in the Census Bureau, confronted the data demands of the 
reapportionment decisions. 
In 1962, the Supreme Court ruled that malapportioned state 
legislatures were unconstitutional and opened the way for the decade 
of lawsuits that led to the “Reapportionment Revolution” of the 
sixties. For forty years the federal courts, and particularly the 
Supreme Court, had refused to rule on apportionment cases. The 
courts had argued that legislative apportionment was strictly a 
legislative matter. In 1962, the Supreme Court changed its position 
and ruled, in Baker v. Carr, that the Tennessee legislature had to be 
reapportioned. A series of cases followed which overthrew 
apportionments in other legislatures and in Congress. By 1964 the 
phrase “one person, one vote”21 had entered the nation’s political 
vocabulary to define the new principle of legislative apportionment.  
Relatedly, the Voting Rights Act of 196522 enforced the mandate 
in the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution requiring that the 
“right . . . to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States 
or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of 
servitude.”23 Congress created clear numerical tests of compliance 
with the constitutional goals of voting rights. As written in the 
original 1965 provision, for example, if a state used a literacy test for 
voter registration, and if voter registration or turnout was less than 
fifty percent of the voting age population of a jurisdiction, then the 
law presumed a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. In such a case, 
the literacy tests were suspended, and the Justice Department could 
send federal registrars and election observers to monitor elections. 
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 Cf. Gray, 372 U.S. at 381 (“The conception of political equality . . . can mean only one 
thing—one person, one vote.”). 
22
 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973–1973aa–6 (2006). 
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 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
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Such jurisdictions also had to “preclear” any new voting 
qualifications with the Attorney General of the United States. At the 
time, six southern states came under these rules; counties in several 
other states were also affected. 
The Court’s decisions and the language of the Voting Rights left 
much of the implementation of the electoral changes to be worked out 
in practice. There were myriad issues to be resolved from the 
sweeping mandates of the 1960s. And one of those issues was a new 
requirement for good quality census data. 
A. The Census in the Limelight 
It is fairly clear that in the 1960s, neither Congress nor the courts 
had spent much time considering the data issues of implementation of 
the reapportionment decisions. At the time, census data seemed to be 
as reliable as an old shoe, simply there for use, an uncontroversial and 
ordinary resource for all parties to use. In fact, however, census data 
are themselves the products of enormous administrative, scientific, 
and political decision making. Neither the leadership in the Census 
Bureau, nor their existing data tabulation programs, were prepared to 
address the data requirements of the reapportionment revolution. 
They were unprepared precisely because for the previous forty years, 
malapportionment of legislative districts was seen as normal, and thus 
the Bureau put very little effort into producing and delivering data for 
political use. Instead, the agency had addressed data production for 
other pressing social and economic issues, and was proud of its 
accomplishments. 
From the 1930s through the early 1960s, the Census Bureau 
pioneered in the development of new methods and new data to 
measure the capacities of a modern industrial economy.24 In so doing, 
the agency recruited a cadre of professional statisticians who became 
increasingly important in the federal statistical system. For much of 
the period, monitoring, analyzing and providing data to address the 
dislocations of the Great Depression was the major challenge. The 
1930 census was taken less than six months after the stock market 
crash. As the Depression tightened its grip on the nation, the Census 
Bureau found itself drawn into a contentious debate about the scope 
and character of unemployment, and thus the causes of the economy’s 
slide. The Bureau leadership was sympathetic with then President 
Herbert Hoover’s stance toward unemployment, and thus the Bureau 
figures from the 1930 Census and a special 1931 Census of 
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 ANDERSON, AMERICAN CENSUS, supra note 6, at 159–90. 
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unemployment put the best face on what clearly was a dramatic rise 
in unemployment nationally. Democratic claims that the Depression 
was deepening were overstated, Census officials claimed. 
Unemployment always existed, especially during the winter and early 
spring months when the census was historically taken. As it turned 
out, Herbert Hoover’s evaluation of the depth of the Depression and 
the appropriate way to cope with it was soundly rejected by the voters 
in 1932. In the spring of 1933, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Dealers 
came to town intent on remaking American government and society 
and ending the Depression. The Census Bureau came in for particular 
scrutiny, as one of Hoover's favorite agencies, and—with the 
exception of the Wilson years—as a longtime Republican 
stronghold.25  
Revitalizing the Census Bureau in the mid-1930s was no easy task. 
Throughout the 1930s, committees of statisticians, economists, and 
other academics—most notably the Committee on Government 
Statistics and Information Services (COGSIS)—investigated Bureau 
practices and found them wanting. Officials from Roosevelt's 
alphabet agencies called upon the Bureau to provide data on the 
socioeconomic situation of the population. Congress built the grant-
in-aid system to allocate tax money from the federal to state and local 
governments, and they sought population data on poverty, income 
distributions, migration. Yet the Census Bureau of the early 1930s 
had yet to devise a credible measure of unemployment, had no data 
on income and did not measure poverty. The New Dealers 
persevered, and by the end of the decade, proposed the introduction of 
sample surveys to measure unemployment, reorganized the agency’s 
bureaucratic structure, increased the statistical training of employees, 
built a research unit and analyzed and revamped classification 
systems. Many of these innovations became part of the 1940 Census. 
The Sixteenth Census of 1940 included a probability sample for the 
first time, a housing census and evaluation studies to measure 
systematically the level of accuracy of the enumeration, the tabulation 
and coding procedures, coding bias, and sampling error. 
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During the World War II years, the research work measuring 
unemployment produced the ongoing Current Population Survey. 
Computerization and data automation followed with UNIVAC and 
FOSDIC in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1960 and 1970, the Bureau 
began the mail census, replacing the time-honored method of using 
in-person enumerators for the decennial count. In conjunction with 
local jurisdictions, mostly large cities, the Bureau instituted programs 
in producing “small area data,” initially census tracts and, in some 
areas, using “blocks” or the new “zip code” as tabulation areas.  
B. Data Needs for Redistricting 
Nevertheless, the apportionment decisions presented challenges 
that the innovations of the previous forty years did not address. The 
first problem was geographic. Many states had simply stopped 
redistricting altogether, or used existing civil divisions as geographic 
building blocks, regardless of population size and change. 
Meanwhile, the Census Bureau advanced its geography program 
primarily to serve the administration of the census. From the Bureau’s 
perspective, definitions were required for two different types of 
geography, what came to be called enumeration or collection 
geography and tabulation geography. Enumeration geography was 
defined to facilitate the census count. Enumeration districts were 
districts where an enumerator could walk from house to house and 
were roughly defined to be of sufficiently equal size to facilitate the 
enumeration. Until the 1980s, the Census Bureau also recreated the 
entire geographic mapping process each decade, using prior 
geography as a guide.  
Tabulation geography is quite a different system. This is the spatial 
definition of reporting places, e.g., the regions, states, counties, town, 
cities, minor civil divisions and so on, for which the Census Bureau 
tabulates the results of the census. Some, such as state boundaries, are 
fairly fixed. But most tabulation geography can change, as local 
jurisdictions annex, consolidate, split, or generally refigure their 
jurisdictions. During the data tabulation process after the census 
information is collected, person and household information collected 
by enumeration geography is aggregated up or transferred to the 
tabulation geography codes for data publication.26   
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Thus as the Census Bureau and the state and local government 
officials charged with redistricting confronted the data issues 
presented by the new mandates for one person, one vote, they found 
themselves scrambling for solutions. During the planning phase for 
the 1970 Census, the issues came into sharp focus. First, officials 
discovered that comprehensive liaison arrangements between states, 
local jurisdictions, and the Census Bureau that might address the data 
issues presented by the new mandates for one person, one vote, did 
not exist. Whose responsibility was it to set standards for fifty 
different states? Who provided training in data use? How did one ask 
for more or different data? Who paid for it?   
Second, what data did the Census Bureau have at hand that could 
be used immediately for the redistricting required after the 1970 
Census? The redistricters very quickly began to define what they 
wanted from the Census Bureau, and four criteria for “good data” 
emerged. First, the data would have to be reported at very low levels 
of geography to serve as building blocks for legislative districts. 
Second, such data should be accessible and easy for the redistricters 
to use. Third, it needed to be timely, e.g., available in the year after 
the census so the redistricters could meet the deadlines for the next 
Congressional election cycle. And fourth, it needed to be 
disaggregated by race for Voting Rights Act enforcement.   
It quickly became clear that the Census Bureau did not have an 
existing data tabulation program that would serve these purposes for 
the nation as a whole. For some states and jurisdictions, tract or block 
level data tabulations existed, developed over the previous half 
century in conjunction with cities and states for urbanized and 
metropolitan areas. But though these programs covered roughly 60 
percent of the nation’s population, they covered only 2 percent of the 
national geography and could not rapidly be expanded to the 
remaining states and jurisdictions.   
The Census Bureau’s solution to the immediate problem after the 
1970 Census was to provide redistricters with the “Master 
Enumeration District List (MEDList) and census maps,” in other 
words, with data aggregated by enumeration or collection geography, 
not tabulation geography. These lists and maps contained population 
and housing counts with comprehensive coverage of the geography of 
the state for all jurisdictions, as well as census tract and blocks where 
applicable. But as the Census Bureau acknowledged, “Many States 
experienced problems in using the MEDList and maps in relation to 
their election or legislative areas because the boundaries of the census 
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entities often did not coincide with the State or local voting district 
boundaries.”27  
C. PL94-171 
Between 1972 and 1975, therefore, Congress, the Census Bureau, 
and state and local officials began a dialog about what to do after the 
1980 Census. The Reapportionment Task Force of the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and the Census Bureau 
began working on data improvements. NCSL conducted surveys. 
Congress and local government organizations held public hearings 
and began to draft legislation to amend Title XIII28 to address the new 
mandates. By 1974, solutions began to emerge in legislative 
language. The House passed bills in 1973 and 1974. The Census 
Bureau expressed concern about elements of the language, 
particularly that the proposed eight month time frame for reporting 
the data was too stringent. In late 1975, Congress passed HR1753, 
which was signed into law in December as PL94-171. The law 
authorized a process for states to cooperate with the Census Bureau in 
defining the geographic areas for which they would receive small area 
population counts for redistricting. The law set a deadline of one year 
after the census date, that is, April 1 of the year after the census, for 
the Bureau to provide the tabulations to the states. The law itself did 
not specify a particular level of geographic detail, but stakeholders 
clearly preferred the smallest possible tabulation area, such as the 
block, because larger geographies were harder to map to existing 
local jurisdictions. It was generally possible to aggregate blocks up to 
wards, for example, but it was not easy to figure out how to split 
population in an enumeration district that crossed two or more wards. 
At the time, block-level geography was defined for about 2.5 million 
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entities in urban and metropolitan areas, covering approximately 60 
percent of the population but only 2 percent of the country’s land 
area. The new law would raise the question about how and whether to 
map the remaining land area and population into small area entities. 
The goals of PL94-171 were partially achieved for the 1980 
Census round. All or part of twenty-three states worked with the 
Census Bureau to customize their data requirements for voting or 
election district data. The states received block level data where 
available and enumeration district data where finer tabulations were 
not designated. Given the technological capacities of the time, the 
data and maps were delivered on paper, computer tape, and 
microfiche. The variables available on the 1980 file for each 
geographic unit were total population broken into five race groupings 
and Hispanic/Latino.29 
After the 1980 Census round, the Bureau and the stakeholders 
from states and local governments committed to improving the 
program for the next census. The Bureau also committed during the 
1980s to building the TIGER/MAF system, a national digitized map 
linked to all addresses in the nation. Computerized geographic 
information system technologies were also developed during the 
1980s, making it possible to move the data distribution process from 
paper and microfiche to electronic media. These new technologies in 
conjunction with continued cooperation with state and local 
governments on small area and block-level mapping, permitted the 
1990 Census PL94-171 data to provide comprehensive small area 
data for redistricting in the entire nation. 
At the 1990 Census, the Bureau expanded the variables to be 
published in the PL94-171 files to include a breakdown of the 
population of an area by total and voting age population, e.g., 
eighteen and over, and it produced block-level data for the entire 
nation, some seven million blocks. With the expansion of the program 
in 1990 and the new GIS technology, which permitted digital 
mapping of these data, not only did the data facilitate ever more 
elaborate mapmaking for legislative districts, it also facilitated the 
visualization of detailed race and ethnic distributions for every place 
in the nation. Newspaper accounts of changes in the white, black, etc. 
population for a local area, which up to 1980 had to be hand drawn by 
a cartographer, usually using census tract data (where it existed), were 
suddenly possible with block level distinctions for the nation as a 
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whole and began to appear in every local newspaper, book or 
magazine with access to reasonably powerful desktop software.30   
The average population of a census block is about thirty-five 
people. The next larger census reporting unit, the block group, has an 
average population size of around 1200. There are over 200,000 such 
units in the nation. To put the matter another way, the average block 
group contains thirty-five blocks, and thirty-five times more people 
than a block. If one divides the block population by race, voting age, 
and ethnicity, empty or extremely small data cells predominate. In 
2000 and 2010, the reporting detail in the PL94-171 files expanded 
once again, as the racial classifications expanded to include results for 
people who checked more than one race, creating dozens more data 
cells per block.  
As long as the tabulation blocks in the PL 94-171 files were seen 
as simple building blocks, namely units to be aggregated up for 
redistricting, the small size of the individual block might seem 
innocuous. But there was one parallel but unexpected result of the 
PL94-171 program, namely the status of the accuracy of the block 
level data, that is, whether the small count for an individual block was 
in some sense “true,” e.g., an accurate reflection of the population of 
the local area, both in size, and by age and race/ethnicity distribution. 
Were there really forty-seven white persons of voting age in a 
particular block? Did it matter if the number was fifty-three or 
twenty-nine? Or if the persons were “really” of a different race or 
ethnic group? Or if thirty-eight of the forty-seven “really” should 
have been counted in a different block, because the geocoding of the 
census results was flawed? That question emerged in the context of 
another population counting issue of the past half century, namely the 
accuracy of the census enumeration itself.   
D. Census Undercount 
During the 1930s and 1940s, as part of the general trend in 
statistical innovation at the Census Bureau, statisticians began their 
first systematic efforts to measure census accuracy.31 Ever since 
George Washington had complained in the 1790s, officials had been 
concerned about undercounting the population. And over the years 
many local officials had objected to their census counts. In response, 
officials had worked to improve the counting process to minimize 
errors, be they what came to be called undercounts, overcounts, 
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miscounts, padding, or curbstoning. The growth of other large scale 
administrative population data systems—vital records and public 
health data in particular—and the development of the disciplines of 
demography and statistics prompted a new set of questions. On one 
hand, these other data systems sometimes generated alternative 
estimates of the population or segments of it. On the other, 
demographers and statisticians needed census counts for the 
denominators for their rate calculations or as sampling frames for 
other studies. Accordingly, both the professional community of 
statisticians and demographers and census officials began to conceive 
of measuring census accuracy precisely for particular segments of the 
population. 
The issue began to be framed precisely after a somewhat 
serendipitous natural experiment in 1940. The selective service 
registration of October 1940 allowed demographers to compare the 
April 1940 census counts of men of draft age (twenty-one to thirty-
five) with the counts of men who registered for the draft. As Daniel 
O. Price reported in his article on the subject, nationally, the census 
under reported about 3 percent of the men in the age cohort since the 
draft registration recorded some 453,000 more men than the census 
did. More significantly, though, was the finding that the level of the 
undercount varied by region and race. Some 13 percent of the black 
men of draft age were missed in the census. Nationally, 229,000 more 
black men registered for the draft than would have been expected 
from the census estimate. Price also demonstrated that the black men 
registered for the draft in dramatically higher numbers in urban states 
than would have been expected from the April census counts. He 
could not, however, determine if such men had migrated to an urban 
area between the time of the census and the registration date, or 
whether the census did a poorer job of counting urban residents. Price 
concluded his article by discussing some of the implications of his 
findings, particularly that the standard indicators of vital rates, such as 
death rates, would have to be recalculated in light of these data.32 
Additional studies followed in later years. In 1955, Ansley Coale, 
as part of the general project of developing a definitive demographic 
analysis of the American population, published a “revision of census 
figures'” by “age, sex, and color” for 1950. Coale's elaborate iterative 
technique used age cohort data by race and sex from the 1930, 1940 
and 1950 Censuses to estimate the size of each cohort for each year, 
adjusted by aging the population forward each decade and correcting 
for deaths and immigration. Coale estimated a net census undercount 
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of about 2.5 percent. He also concluded that the census undercounted 
“nonwhites” dramatically—by 11 percent in 1950. Again, his 
“revisions” were in service of his larger demographic project so he 
ended his analysis by producing revised data by race, sex and age for 
use by demographers.33 
In the 1950s, the Census Bureau also began evaluation studies of 
undercounts as part of their larger evaluation program. One research 
thrust employed the methods “demographic analysis” as the 
techniques used by Coale and Price came to be called. Information 
from earlier censuses and other population data sources were 
compared with the aggregate population counts for particular cohorts 
of the population. A researcher might compare the data from cohorts 
organized by age, race, sex, region in two sources and calculate 
estimates of the differences for each cohort. The corrected cohorts 
were then reaggregated to generate an overall estimate of the 
accuracy of the count. 
Demographic analysis as a technique has the advantage of being 
relatively easy to undertake. The researcher may have to make a very 
large number of individual cohort analyses. A matrix based upon, for 
example, two sex categories, fifteen five-year age cohorts, two racial 
groups (white/nonwhite), in two data systems generated 120 
individual cohort estimates. Price’s selective service/1940 Census 
comparison generated ninety-eight cohort estimates of undercount, 
that is, for the two race categories, and the forty-eight states plus the 
District of Columbia. Nevertheless, once the appropriate data are 
available, the analysis is relatively straightforward. 
The disadvantage of demographic analysis is its inability to 
pinpoint exactly why the undercount (or overcount) exists. As an 
aggregate methodology, it cannot identify which particular 
individuals were missed, nor can it provide more specific information 
on the sources of undercount beyond the information available from 
the original cohort variables. 
To overcome these disadvantages, the Census Bureau developed 
new techniques, particularly the post enumeration survey (PES). After 
the 1950 Census, the Bureau undertook a sample re-enumeration of 
the country to try to identify households missed by the enumerators, 
household members who were not reported within households, as 
well as other classification and categorization errors in the original 
enumeration. The survey used trained interviewers to improve the 
quality of the information reported. The Bureau then matched the 
information from the sample survey to the original census forms and 
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developed estimates of the quality of the original count. Analysis of 
the results again indicated an undercount and poorer coverage of the 
nonwhite population.  
By the time of the 1960 Census, census officials and the 
community of professional demographers were well on their way to 
understanding census undercounts. They built evaluations procedures 
in the form of a post enumeration survey and demographic analysis 
into the 1960 Census design. Professional discussions continued 
quietly on the best means to estimate undercounts for particular 
groups in the population, as well as to develop new census 
methodologies to count better in the first place. These methodological 
discussions are evident in the Bureau technical reports, and in the 
general social science literature of the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
What was still missing from the undercount discussion was any 
sense that there were any larger political or social implications of the 
undercount. From the 1940s through the mid-1960s, the literature was 
totally “methodological”—of interest to demographers, statisticians 
and survey researchers, but not to Congressmen, policymakers, or the 
undercounted communities. This situation changed dramatically in 
the mid-1960s. 
The reapportionment decisions and the increasing use of federal 
funds allocations based on population formulas propelled the census 
undercount onto the political stage in the mid-1960s. In 1960, 15 
percent of state and local funding came from federal aid. Once the 
Supreme Court had invalidated the massive legislative 
malapportionments of the past, the statisticians and politicians 
realized that the census undercount also could have the effect of 
denying representation to the uncounted. As with the new mandates 
for small area data for redistricting, the Census Bureau found itself 
facing new scrutiny and demands from state and local government 
officials not just to measure, but to eliminate census undercount.   
E. Improving the Accuracy of the Census 
For most of the 1970s and 1980s, at the same time that the Bureau 
was working to develop new technologies and data series to provide 
small area data for redistricting, it was also embroiled in a complex 
set of controversies about improving the accuracy of the count. 
Congress, statisticians, local officials, and minority representatives 
demanded that the Bureau count the population better. They also 
began to ask why the Bureau could measure the level of the 
undercount but could not correct for it in the published tabulations. 
The Bureau responded by explaining the limits of demographic 
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analysis, then the gold standard for undercount measurement. Critics 
were not convinced and pointed out that the bureau was quite adept at 
technical innovation. If it could pioneer in computer use and the 
TIGER/MAF system, why could it not figure out how to correct for 
census undercounts? When the prodding from congressional oversight 
committees and public pressure did not seem to be yielding results, 
local governments, particularly New York City, took the Commerce 
Department to court to force the constitutional issues. The Bureau 
successfully defended itself against fifty-four lawsuits after the 1980 
Census.34 
In the 1980s, statisticians and the Bureau began to develop new 
methods to improve the count and to experiment with adjustment 
methods to correct for undercounts. The budget for the census grew 
dramatically. New advisory committees worked on the planning 
efforts. By the late 1980s, the Bureau developed what it hoped would 
be a statistically defensible method of adjusting the decennial census 
for the undercount. The new design included a large post enumeration 
survey with dual systems estimation to measure error in the census 
enumeration, and a post stratification method to carry down the 
corrected counts to the small geographic levels needed for 
redistricting. In other words, as with the innovations spawned from 
the passage of PL94-171, it looked at the time that the new 
requirements for accurate small area data prompted by the 
reapportionment decisions would also prompt the use of new methods 
to measure accuracy in the count and correct for identifiable error.  
It did not turn out that way. Undercount and error correction 
seemed to all sides of the political spectrum to contain a partisan bias, 
namely it would benefit areas that voted Democratic. Thus, the new 
methods came under tremendous scrutiny, and that scrutiny quickly 
took on a partisan cast. The Commerce Department of the Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush administrations tried to cancel the new program 
to measure and correct for undercount. In response, the City of New 
York again sued, and the courts mandated that the new methods be 
implemented in 1990. The post-enumeration survey program went 
forward, but the decision whether to use the adjusted counts was 
postponed until after the census. In 1991, the census director 
recommended adjustment but the commerce secretary decided not to 
adjust the 1990 Census results. Further litigation upheld the 
secretary’s decision as within the scope of the Administrative 
Procedures Act.35 
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The irony was that the court rulings ultimately depended on how 
one evaluated the capacity of the program to correct for error at the 
block level. Everyone conceded the small size the tabulation unit 
increased the uncertainty of any block level count or estimate. Were 
the unadjusted counts inviolable, as Republicans claimed, because the 
supporters of adjustment could not prove they were more accurate at 
the block level? Or should the adjusted block level tabulations be 
used, as Democrats claimed, since when aggregated for legislative 
districts they resulted in districts with less known bias deriving from 
the census error?36   
In the 1990s, Bill Clinton’s administration took the latter tack, 
proposing a census design that included adjustment of the 2000 
Census, including the apportionment counts. Republican members of 
Congress sued to stop the Clinton plan. In Department of Commerce 
v. United States House of Representatives,37 the Supreme Court ruled 
that the current census statute prevented the use of sampling methods 
for reapportioning congressional seats after the 2000 census. The 
Census Bureau changed the design for the 2000 count so that the 
remaining census results, including the redistricting data, could be 
adjusted if the results indicated that adjusted data were more accurate. 
In 2001, the Census Bureau decided against adjustment, and the 
George W. Bush administration did not revive further efforts to adjust 
census results for undercount or to plan for such an eventuality in the 
2010 census.38   
III. CURRENT STATUS OF CENSUS QUALITY 
The statistical innovations of the post enumeration survey with 
dual systems estimation were not implemented to adjust the census 
for error. In 2000 innovations in the traditional census methodology, 
notably better outreach and advertising and a sharply increased 
budget, narrowed the level of the national undercount. These were 
repeated in 2010. Evaluations of the accuracy of the 2010 count will 
be published in 2012. 
The latest evidence available of census accuracy is from the 2000 
count. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel charged with 
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reviewing the 2000 census concluded that “net undercount rates 
were . . . reduced in 2000” compared to 1990 and the differentials 
between groups were also reduced.39 But they cautioned, “the 2000 
census overcounted the total population” by 1.3 million people and 
“differences in net undercount rates between such groups as 
minorities and others and owners and renters remain.” And they 
noted, “[c]ensus counts at the block level—whether adjusted or 
unadjusted—are subject to high levels of error and hence should be 
used only when aggregated to larger geographic areas.”40 The NAS 
panel also recommended amending PL94-171:  
The experience with the 2000 Accuracy and Coverage 
Evaluation Program and the evaluation of census processes 
and data content make clear that useful evaluation requires 
considerable time. In particular, it appears difficult to 
complete sufficiently comprehensive assessments of 
population coverage and the quality of basic characteristics 
by the currently mandated schedule for releasing block-level 
census data for use in redistricting (which is 12 months after 
Census Day).41  
And they continued; “Congress should consider moving the deadline 
to provide block-level census data for legislative redistricting to allow 
more time for evaluation of the completeness of population coverage 
and quality of the basic demographic items before they are 
released.”42 The recommendation has yet to find supporters in 
Congress. 
In short, states will complete the 2010 decennial redistricting 
round before the Census Bureau reports the level of bias and 
inaccuracy in the 2010 results. It remains to be seen if that fact will 
lead to further litigation or legislation.43  
                                                                                                                 
39
 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 2000 CENSUS: COUNTING UNDER ADVERSITY 
248 (Constance F. Citro, Daniel L. Cork & Janet L. Norwood eds., 2004). 
40
 Id. at 30. 
41
 Id.  
42
 Id. at 267. 
43
 On May 22, 2012, the Census Bureau reported the results of the post enumeration 
survey to evaluate the accuracy of the 2010 census. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, NEWSROOM, Census Bureau Releases Estimates of Undercount and Overcount in the 
2010 Census (May 22, 2012) http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/ 
cb12-95.html; U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PRESS KITS, CENSUS 
COVERAGE MEASUREMENT (May 22, 2012) http://2010.census.gov/news/press-
kits/ccm/ccm.html. The Bureau reported a net national overcount of .01 percent. This result was 
not statistically significantly different from the results in 2000. The Bureau estimated 16 million 
omissions in the household population, which were balanced by a roughly equal number of 
“erroneous enumerations,” mostly duplicate enumerations. Thus a more rigorous measure of 
accuracy called “gross error” (which adds the erroneous enumerations and the omissions) comes 
2012] THE ORIGIN AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC LAW 94-171 1177 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
to over 10 percent of the household population of 300.7 million, though as of this date, 
significant differential coverage does not appear to affect the uses of the data, including for 
redistricting. 
124
